Globalization, National Identity and Foreign Policy: Understanding 'Global Korea' by John, Jojin V.
38 ____________________ The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 33(2)•2015
Jojin V. John _______________________________________________________________
Globalization, National Identity and 




One of the striking themes in contemporary South Korean foreign policy is a 
strong emphasis on achieving seonjinguk (advanced nation) status in international 
affairs, as articulated in the slogan 'Global Korea'. Engaging with the discourse 
of globalization, the concept of seonjinguk has provided Korea with an interpre-
tive framework for discussions of its national identity and global position. The 
historical experience of Korea as a hujinguk (backward country) underlies the 
emphasis accorded to the goal of becoming seonjinguk. The article argues that the 
discursive practice of Global Korea was not merely a point of departure in Korean 
foreign policy but was also the key site of Korean national identity construc-
tion. Through an exploration of the historical context and diplomatic practice 
of constructing Global Korea, it illustrates the continuity and authority of the 
discourse of seonjinguk in interpreting and constructing Korean national identity.
Keywords: South Korean foreign policy, Global Korea, Korean national identity, 
Globalization-Segyehwa, Seonjinguk discourse
Introduction1
In the run-up to assuming the G20 presidency in December 2009, South 
Korea's (hereafter: Korea) former president, Lee Myung-bak, announced 
that 'Korea will come into global focus as a host of the G20 summit and 
by taking on that responsibility, will become a genuinely advanced na-
tion'.2 Furthermore, Korean media viewed the selection of Seoul as the 
venue for the 2010 G20 Summit, for the ﬁrst time outside the G8 and as 
the ﬁrst Asian country to host the event, as the international communi-
ty's recognition of Korea as an advanced nation.3 The hosting of the G20 
Summit was celebrated in the mood of a national festival. It was widely 
viewed as a great boost to national pride and an instant enhancement of 
Korea's international image. The Seoul G20 Summit was the ﬁrst major 
international diplomatic event hosted by Korea. Following the summit, 
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Seoul hosted the fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in 2011 
and the second Global Nuclear Security Summit in 2012, marking Korea's 
arrival as an inﬂuential actor in international affairs. 
Hosting high proﬁle international diplomatic events was among a 
range of new foreign policy initiatives undertaken under the slogan 
Global Korea by the Lee Myung-bak administration after assuming 
ofﬁce in 2008. The primary objective of the Global Korea vision is to 
achieve advanced nation status in international affairs. On unveiling 
the new administration's foreign policy, foreign minister Yu Myung-
hwan stated: 'we will focus on nurturing Korea into a truly advanced 
and globally prestigious country, the vision embraced by the new gov-
ernment, taking us closer to fully realising the goal of building a truly 
Global Korea' (MOFAT 2008:5). Under the Global Korea banner, Seoul 
initiated an array of diplomatic practices of a scale and scope unprec-
edented in Korean history. 
 The interpretative scope of Global Korea rhetoric reached beyond 
diplomacy and into almost all areas of Korean public policy under the 
Lee administration. However, its articulation in foreign policy was 
particularly strong and it has received signiﬁcant attention from the 
academic community. The bulk of literature on the subject focused on 
mapping the transformation of Korea's foreign policy and describing 
various diplomatic initiatives under the Lee administration (Han 2008; 
Ikenberry and Mo 2013; Olbrich and Shim 2012;4 Snyder 2012). Accord-
ing to these studies, Global Korea is a manifestation of the Lee adminis-
tration's determination to translate Korea's economic clout into political 
inﬂuence in a rapidly changing world. In a critical analysis, Watson 
(2011) views Global Korea as the product of an elitist and state-led re-
appraisal of Korea's national interests and national security in relation 
to globalization. Kalinowski and Cho (2012) contend that leadership 
and opportunity-seeking behaviour articulated in the Global Korea is 
merely an adaptation of the mercantilist developmental state under the 
conditions of globalization, as a means to securing the foundations for 
sustained economic growth. 
However, the existing debates on Global Korea do not attempt to 
position the strategy in a historical context. For example, one key di-
mension of Global Korea foreign policy was its projection of Korea as 
a 'middle power'5 (see John 2014; Lee 2012; Saxer 2013; Shin 2015). The 
Lee government was the ﬁrst to adopt the middle power rhetoric ofﬁ-
cially into Korean foreign policy, and Global Korea was the platform to 
launch Korea's middle power diplomacy. However, the scholarship on 
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the subject failed to recognize the analytical distinction between middle 
power identity and advanced nation status, nor the linkage between the 
two in the Global Korea context.
This article is an attempt to provide an alternative reading of Global 
Korea foreign policy and how the vision came into being, from the 
vantage point of national identity at the interface of globalization and 
foreign policy. In doing so, the notion of advanced nation articulated in 
the Global Korea foreign policy discourse is problematized. The theme 
of achieving advanced nation status is not new in Korean foreign policy 
discourse, but rather illuminates the continuing inﬂuence of globaliza-
tion discourse on Korean foreign policy since the early 1990s. Diplomatic 
globalization as a means to achieving advanced nation status was ﬁrst 
articulated under the slogan segyehwa (globalization)6 in the mid 1990s 
by President Kim Young-sam, and it continued to quietly inform foreign 
policy discourse during the progressive governments of the 2000s, only 
to vigorously resurface under the conservative administration of Lee 
Myung-bak.
This article aims to show that the discourse of Global Korea was not 
merely a point of departure in Korean diplomatic practice but was also 
the key site of Korean national identity construction, as manifest in the 
discourse of achieving seonjinguk (advanced nation) status through de-
velopment.7 However, in the context of globalization, the scope of the 
discourse of seonjinguk has been expanded on the pretext of meeting a 
'global-standard' in every aspect of Korean public life. In particular, it 
was applied to Korean foreign policy, which was often viewed as 'catch-
ing up' with the diplomatic practices of certain Western countries. 
The article is organized in ﬁve thematic sections. The introduction is 
followed by a discussion of Korean national identity dynamics under 
the inﬂuence of globalization. The third section discusses the inﬂuence 
of seonjinguk discourse in the framing of Korean foreign policy, under 
different regimes, thus tracking the evolution of Global Korea. The fourth 
section focuses on Global Korea as a diplomatic practice, its interpreta-
tion and connection with seonjinguk. The concluding section discusses 
key aspects of Global Korea diplomatic practices. 
Globalization and Korean National Identity 
Globalization has been avidly discussed in the post-Cold War period. 
The excitement of engaging with globalization was such that the Ko-
rean government under President Kim Young-sam adopted its Korean 
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translation, segyehwa, as ofﬁcial policy and pursued it vigorously. Glo-
balization was viewed as the most expedient way for Korea to become 
a world-class, advanced nation. According to Samuel Kim 'no country 
in the post-Cold War world cast its lots with globalization as decisively 
or as publicly as Korea' (2000a: 2). However, the relationship between 
globalization and national identity is complex and multifaceted, as both 
concepts are theoretically contested. The existing literature mostly links 
national identity with ethnicity (Kim 2000a, Shin 2003). These studies 
observed that Korea simultaneously exhibits both strong nationalist 
and globalizing tendencies, but they fall short of providing a convinc-
ing explanation for the coexistence of globalism and nationalism. This 
has been called the Korean paradox, on the premise that one position 
is antithetical to the other. This article does not seek to address this 
'paradox' but instead, by historicizing Global Korea, aims to shed some 
light on the context and conditions that enabled Korea to exhibit strong 
nationalist and globalist tendencies simultaneously.
Drawing on post-structural theories of identity, the article assumes 
that national identities are speciﬁc forms of discursive social identi-
ties, produced, reproduced, transformed and destructed by means 
of language and other semiotic systems (De Cellia et al. 1999: 153).  It 
also assumes that there is no single national identity in an essential-
izing sense, but rather different identities are discursively constructed 
according to the context, depending on the social ﬁeld, situational set-
ting of the discursive act, and the topic being discussed. Thus, national 
identities are to be understood as dynamic, fragile, vulnerable and often 
incoherent against the conventional understanding of national identity 
as consistent, stable and immutable (Ibid.: 154). The discursive features 
of national identity not only allow for the possibility of the existence 
of different identities at different points in history, but also enable co-
existing identities at any given point of history.
Developmentalism is another theoretical framework that has been 
inﬂuential in discussions of national identity and the worldviews of 
many countries in the post-WW2 period (see Escobar 1995; Nederveen 
2009). The present study focuses on the discourse of developmental-
ism in Korea, towards understanding national identity dynamics in 
the context of globalization. An aspect of the Eurocentric world order, 
developmentalism was present in Korea through the discourse of seon-
jinguk and became the most inﬂuential discursive framework for the 
interpretation of Korean national identity in the world during the second 
half of the twentieth century.8 Kim (2011a) observes that the discourse 
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of seonjinguk is a historically constructed knowledge system based on 
the conceptual relationship between seonjinguk and hujinguk, which 
more or less reﬂects the classiﬁcatory distinction between 'developed' 
and 'underdeveloped' in the Eurocentric developmental model. In the 
hierarchical distinction between seonjinguk and hujinguk, the former 
takes the latter as its alienated other, and has provided a justiﬁcation 
for Korea's effort to 'catch up' with seonjinguk (Kim 2012: 83). 
The evolution of the discourse of seonjinguk in Korea can be traced 
to the founding of the developmental regime in the 1960s (Kim 2011a). 
The developmental agenda and national vision of Park Chung-hee, who 
seized power through a military coup in 1961, was the point of departure 
for Korea's developmental trajectory and national identity.
In the discourse of developmentalism, seonjinguk has become an ideal 
image for the transformation of Korean society, an urgent national goal 
and a central reference point. Eurocentrism runs through the discourse 
of seonjinguk, and shapes the normative model of an advanced, normal 
and a mature being (Kim 2012: 119). Kim categorized the representa-
tion of seonjinguk in two types: concrete and abstract (2011a: 102). The 
concrete type referred to particular countries, international institutions 
and international status groups. High income Western countries and 
Japan were typically represented as seonjinguk. The Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), OECD – Develop-
ment Assistance Committee (DAC), and Annexe 1 of the Kyoto Protocol 
etc. were often represented as the club of seonjinguk. As an abstract 
entity, seonjinguk was represented as a national goal, national status, 
and as the most desirable level or type of attainment.  Like any other 
discourse, the discourse of seonjinguk is dynamic and its assumptions 
and representations of Korea's historical transformation have been af-
fected by various factors at the national and global level. This ﬂuidity 
is also manifest in the different governmental slogans adopted by suc-
cessive Korean governments in their efforts to utilize the authority of 
the seonjinguk ideal. Three key slogans can be identiﬁed: (1) guendaewa 
(modernization), during authoritarian regimes from the early 1960s till 
the mid-1980s; (2) segyehwa during the 1990s; and (3) seonjinwa (achiev-
ing advancement) since the late 2000s (Kim 2014). 
The Park regime was both anti-communist and pressing for economic 
development. It produced a new, synthetic discourse of authority 
by combining the ethos of development and anti-communism with 
nationalism under the slogan joguk geundaehwa (modernization of the 
motherland). When the regime assumed authority in the 1960s, it deﬁned 
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Korea's status as hujinguk in the international community, problematiz-
ing Korea's poverty, its backward economy and traditional ways of life. 
Informed by the discourse of seonjinguk, the most urgent national goal for 
the Park regime was to escape from the status of hujinguk (Kim 2011a). 
The authoritarian regime of Chun Du-hwan in the 1980s inherited 
much of the Park administration's legacy and continued the pursuit of 
national economic development. During this period, the discursive ﬁeld 
of the seonjinguk discourse was limited to the ﬁelds of economy, industry 
and technology. The discursive power of seonjinguk was instrumental in 
the ideological foundations of Korea's 'catch-up' economic model. 
The discourse of seonjinguk has undergone a signiﬁcant transformation 
under the inﬂuence of globalization since the late 1980s. Having achieved 
industrialization and democratization, Korea was in need of a different 
development model: the aim was to 'upgrade Korea' to effectively meet 
the global challenge (Park 2006). The Kim Young-sam administration 
(1992-97) launched segyehwa as the ofﬁcial globalization policy. In his 
New Year's address in 1995, President Kim promulgated the need for 
segyehwa as a way for Korea to face international competition, which 
was viewed as both a crisis and an opportunity (Kim 1997).9 Korean 
elites considered globalization as a universal trend and thus enthusi-
astically advocated globalization as the route to global competitiveness 
and advancement (Kim 2012: 80). The segyehwa policy was unique as it 
set out to globalize the country through a state-enhancing, top-down 
strategic plan with the purpose of meeting the challenge of globaliza-
tion as deﬁned by the government (KOIS 1995).  The Globalization 
Committee argued that:
The 'segyehwa' policy purports to adapt actively ourselves to the changes 
taking place and to promote development, thus not to repeat the failures of 
the past. In other words, this is a strategy to reform our consciousness and 
the institutions [. . .] ultimately to become an central country of the world 
in the future. (PSPC: 22-23, author's translation)
The Kim Young-sam government approached Korea's national iden-
tity as almost 'seonjinguk' in its domestic and foreign affairs, but the desire 
to achieve the status was stronger than ever before. Following Korea's 
entry into OECD in 1996, the building of full-ﬂedged seonjinguk was 
accepted as a tangible national vision that was imminently achievable 
(Kim 2011b: 335).   
During this period, the discourse of seonjinguk underwent critical 
transformations. Three changes were very signiﬁcant. First, the concept 
of seonjinguk became far more popularized and naturalized in its use 
44 ____________________ The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 33(2)•2015
Jojin V. John _______________________________________________________________
in public; its connotations also became more generalized and idealized 
(Kim 2011b: 333). The second change was the expansion of the discursive 
ﬁeld of seonjinguk beyond economic matters, to permeate almost every 
aspect of Korean public policy, including education, diplomacy, the 
environment, labour, health, etc. The third change reﬂected the trans-
formation and consolidation of democracy in Korea. Though not chal-
lenging the discursive structure and authority of seonjinguk discourse, an 
interpretative rift appeared between the conservative and progressive 
factions in Korean politics. Conservatives argued for a seonjinguk ideal 
that favoured freedom, growth and gradual reform towards capitalism. 
They supported a free market economy, much in line with the American 
version of neoliberalism. In contrast, the progressive camp embraced 
democratic values and the ideals of a welfare state; they identiﬁed with 
the Western European model that favoured equality and a fundamental 
reform of capitalism through government intervention (Son 2014: 5). 
To meet the challenges of the Asian ﬁnancial crisis, the new Kim Dae-
jung administration embraced the content of segyehwa policy from the 
outset of its inauguration in 1998. President Kim utilized the discursive 
authority of seonjinguk discourse to overcome domestic resistance to 
implementing structural adjustment programmes prescribed by the 
IMF. The neoliberal reforms were appropriated as a necessary step 
towards achieving seonjinguk status (Kim 2011b: 339). However, dur-
ing the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun regime, the discursive focus 
of seonjinguk was more pluralistic and populist, in keeping with their 
progressive politics. Under the slogan 'Universal Globalism' the ideals 
of seonjinguk were articulated in terms of democracy, liberty, freedom, 
welfare, human rights, etc.; this aligned with their agenda of intensify-
ing democratization and building a welfare state.10 
The return of conservative government under President Lee My-
ung-bak in the post-2008 ﬁnancial crisis period witnessed the return 
of a strong seonjinguk discourse used to appropriate public policies 
and national identity. Under President Lee, the seonjinguk discourse 
was promulgated through the slogan of seonjinhwa and was central to 
the government's vision for Korean identity (Chung and Park 2010; Im 
2014; Kim 2014). Park deﬁned seonjinhwa as the development and im-
plementation of new strategies, including (a) economy (USD 30,000 per 
capita income era);11 (b) politics (supporting liberal democracy instead of 
populism); (c) society (ﬁnding an appropriate balance between private 
and public interests); (d) culture (the creation of a global culture); and 
(e) international relations (making a global contribution).12 At its core, 
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seonjinhwa rhetoric articulated the essence of a neoliberal vision of col-
lective efforts to realize globalized and post-modern goals for progress 
through innovation (Son 2014: 5). In President Lee's vision, seonjinhwa 
represented the later stage of development, a necessary foundation upon 
which Korea would become an advanced nation.13
Globalization and Korean Foreign Policy 
During the Cold War period, the inﬂuence of the discourse of seonjinguk 
was limited to the ﬁeld of economy and had no real impact on foreign 
policy. Korean foreign policy during the Cold War period focused 
primarily on national survival in the event of a North Korean military 
invasion, and on maintaining the legitimacy of the Korean regime in 
the international community. Korean foreign policy was guided by the 
slogan bukuk gangbyong (rich state, strong army) and promoted a strong 
anti-communist national identity (Moon and Kim 2004: 252). Segyehwa 
policy, however, was not just about making the necessary domestic 
changes to make Korean economy competitive, it was also a call for the 
fundamental transformation of every aspect of Korean public policy − 
including international affairs − in order to achieve seonjinguk status. 
This ambition built on the legacies of rapid economic development 
and the conﬁdence gained on hosting the hugely successful Olympics 
Games in 1988 (Lee 2000).14 The Korean government wanted to show the 
world that Korea was no longer a poverty-stricken Asian war victim but 
a strong, modern and increasingly prosperous country with a vibrant 
society. The success of the Seoul Olympics inculcated the populace with 
a sense of national pride and a heightened awareness of international-
ism (Lee 2000: 177). 
Han Sung-joo, the foreign minister of Kim Young-sam administration, 
articulated segyehwa as a key component of Korea's 'New Diplomacy' (Sin 
Oegyo). It was framed as the ﬁrst of ﬁve basic themes relevant for Korea's 
foreign policy outlook: globalism, diversiﬁcation, multi-dimensionality, 
regional cooperation and future orientation (Gills and Gills 2000: 95). 
Advocating a new foreign policy vision to meet the global diplomatic 
standard of advanced nations, Han argued:
[W]ith the advent of the era of globalism, Korea's diplomacy needs to pay 
more attention to such universal values as freedom, justice, peace and 
welfare… We will take an active part in international efforts to tackle global 
issues such as international peace and security, disarmament and arms 
control, eradication of poverty, protection of environment, and efﬁcient 
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utilisation of natural resources. Through such agreements, we will play 
our due part in making a more just, safe and prosperous world. (quoted in 
Koh 2000: 198)
Under segyehwa, achieving advanced national status in international 
affairs was interpreted as expanding Seoul's diplomatic reach across the 
globe and participating in major international organisations, such as the 
UN and OECD. Since the late 1980s, Seoul has made efforts to expand 
and diversify its diplomatic engagements. The number of countries with 
whom Korea has formal diplomatic relations has steadily increased from 
126 in 1985, to 146 in 1990, to 186 by the end of 1998. As of November 
2015, Korea has diplomatic relations with 190 countries.15 Korea's mem-
bership of intergovernmental organizations (IGO) likewise increased 
from 36 in 1985 to 52 in 1998; and its membership of international 
intergovernmental organisations (INGOs) increased from 686 to 1250 
in the same period (Lee 2000). According to Samuel Kim (2000b: 265), 
the global reach of Korean foreign policy began to ﬂourish in the 1990s: 
through Korea-Russia normalisation (1990), Korea's UN membership 
(1991), Korea-China normalisation (1992), Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and development (OECD) membership (1996) and UN 
Security Council membership (1996-97). In 1997, the Korean Foreign 
Ministry renewed its pledge to work towards 'globalization diplomacy' 
so that the government could respond more effectively to ﬂuctuating 
international situations and make Korea a 'ﬁrst-rate advanced nation' 
(MOFAT 1997: 108).  The Korean Foreign Ministry emphasized the 
growing importance and inﬂuence of the UN, stating: 
[A]s the UN expected to play a greater role in dealing with such global issues 
as disarmament, environment, human rights and narcotics in the post-cold 
war period, our nation should pursue an active UN diplomacy to secure the 
maximum level of our national interests and to assume a role commensurate 
with our position in the international community (ibid.). 
Lee observed that UN-oriented global diplomacy enjoyed broad 
popular support in Korea and also promoted membership in prestigious 
international organisations including the OECD and the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) (2000: 117). Samuel Kim noted that segyehwa was 
viewed by many Koreans as a passport into the OECD and the UN 
Security Council; it was how Korea would become 'a central player on 
the world stage' (Kim 2000b: 244). 
In 1991 the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) was 
established to expand Korea's grant aid programmes for developing 
countries. This was a way to show the world Korea's successful trans-
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formation from a recipient of aid to a donor, the ﬁrst country to do so. 
Lee noted that ofﬁcial development assistance (ODA) discourses in the 
1990s centred on two themes: to make Korea an advanced country and 
to globalise the national experiences of Korean economic development 
(2003). Lee also observed that Korean ODA policy under segyehwa policy 
increasingly attracted civil society partnerships, reﬂecting the popular 
support for and national pride in Korea's change of status from recipi-
ent to donor. 
Korean foreign policy under Kim Dae-jung continued to use the dis-
cursive authority of seonjinguk to inﬂuence the economic domain and 
was instrumental in deepening neoliberal reform in the post-ﬁnancial 
crisis context. But it was more regionally oriented and there was less 
rhetoric about achieving seonjinguk status in international affairs. Presi-
dent Kim argued for 'a new language of nationalism calling for national 
unity to survive and gain leadership in the international community' 
(Park 1996).16 Under the new nationalist discourse, President Kim initi-
ated the Sunshine Policy, the engagement and reconciliation approach 
to inter-Korean relations. 
Roh Moo-hyun (2002-2007) picked up where his predecessor left 
off by championing inter-Korean engagement and reconciliation. Like 
President Kim Dae-jung, President Roh framed his foreign policies in 
peninsular and regional terms (Levin and Han 2002). However, the 
rhetoric of achieving advanced nation status in the ofﬁcial foreign policy 
discourse under President Roh shifted from participatory governance 
towards a neoliberal free-trade agenda, in order to make Korea an 'ad-
vanced trading nation'.17
2008 saw the end of a decade of progressive rule with the return of 
conservative government under President Lee Myung-bak. Achieving 
advanced nation status for Korea in international affairs by building 
Global Korea was the stated objective of the Lee administration's foreign 
policy (Cheong Wa Dae 2009). Global Korea was ofﬁcially deﬁned as: 
[A] Republic of Korea that not only cooperates actively, but also offers 
solutions for dealing with common issues facing the world community. 
[….] Korea that leaves behind a habit of diplomacy narrowly geared to the 
Korean Peninsula, and adopts a more open and enterprising posture that 
sees the world stage as the appropriate platform for its foreign policy and 
national interest… the time is now ripe for Korea to strive to become a more 
digniﬁed country and to ﬁnd its place among the ranks of advanced nations. 
This is what the Lee Myung-bak Administration's vision for a Global Korea 
aspires to achieve. (Cheong Wa Dae 2009: 12)
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Korean foreign policy under Global Korea was a major departure from 
the previous administration's foreign policy outlook.18 It is important to 
recognize that Global Korea was not merely a strategy but also a hugely 
popular aspirational identity for Korea in the international community 
(Lee 2011). 
Advanced nation status was not the only identity articulated in the 
Global Korea foreign policy; it also emphasized middle power identity 
(junggyun guk) (John 2014; Lee 2012; Saxer 2013; Shin 2015). Global 
Korea's advanced nation status and middle power identity are quite 
inseparable. Nonetheless, although they may appear to be performing 
similar foreign policy functions in the context of Global Korea, they 
are two different identities presenting different conceptions of national 
identity. As noted, seonjinguk status is associated with general ideals 
of development or progress, mostly interpreted in material terms. In 
contrast, middle power identity is associated with the status and foreign 
policy behaviour of a country that has positioned itself in between 
great powers and small powers, in terms of the hierarchical ranking of 
countries deﬁned according to power capabilities. 
In terms of its power attributes, Korea was clearly a middle power. 
However, it was only during the Lee government that Korea's middle 
power identity was ofﬁcially acknowledged and used to deﬁne Korea's 
international role. I argue that Global Korea is the discursive policy space 
where the seonjinguk and middle power identity projects met. Though 
the discursive authority of seonjinguk was the force underpinning the 
'catch up' motivation to build Global Korea, the appropriate template for 
the Global Korea foreign policy was directed by Korea's middle power 
identity. Thus, the diplomatic practice of Global Korea can be regarded 
as a manifestation of Korea's efforts to catch up with the diplomatic 
norms and practices of advanced Western middle power countries, 
especially Australia and Canada.19
'Global Korea' Diplomatic Practice 
The Lee administration's Global Korea foreign policy was a clear de-
parture in terms of the reach and scale of diplomatic activism in com-
parison with previous administrations. Through Global Korea foreign 
policy, Korea sought to inﬂuence and shape sustainable political, legal, 
socio-economic, security and ideational structures at the international 
level. It emphasized selected international issues, like international 
development, peace-keeping and environment, and it initiated a range 
_________________________________________________________________________49
_____________________________ Globalization, National Identity and Foreign Policy
of new diplomatic practices like hosting international meetings, nation 
branding, public and cultural diplomacy, etc.
At the outset, Global Korea strategy had a strong emphasis on national 
image and international reputation. President Lee initiated a widely 
publicized nation branding campaign and created the Presidential 
Council on Nation Branding (PCNB) in 2009. The PCNB was born out 
of the government's concern over the gap between Korea's successful 
economic development and its image and reputation in the eyes of 
foreigners. In response to the relatively low performance of Korea in 
the Anholt-GfK Roper Nation Brand index, President Lee announced 
his intention to raise Korea's rank from 33rd in 2008 to 15th in 2013.20 
In his address to the nation, President Lee said:
[It is] extremely important for Korean people to earn the respect of the 
international community. […] Korea is one of the most advanced nations 
technologically. Still, the ﬁrst images that come to mind to foreigners are 
those of strikes and street demonstrations. If our nation wants to be 'labelled' 
as a developed country, it needs […] to improve its nation brand and its 
reputation signiﬁcantly. Korea's national brand value is only 30 per cent of 
our economic power… I will upgrade our national brand value to that of an 
advanced nation during my term of ofﬁce.21
The PCNB has undertaken a ten-point action plan. 22 These plans in-
clude the global promotion of Taekwondo (Korean martial art); creation 
of a service of international volunteers (World Friends Korea);23 to adopt 
a 'Korean Wave' programme;24 to introduce a Global Korea Scholarship; 
to adopt a campus Asia programme; to increase external aid; to develop 
state of art technologies; to nurture the culture and tourism industries; 
to treat foreigners and multicultural families better; and to help Koreans 
become 'global citizens'.25 The Korean government also employs cultural 
diplomacy to enhance Korea's image: there are initiatives to subsidize 
the production of dramas, movies and documentaries targeting overseas 
screenings, in order to sustain the Korean Wave. The Korean language 
is also being promoted overseas through the establishment of 500 King 
Sejong Institutes by 2015.26 
As previously noted, the hosting of high-proﬁle international meet-
ings was another diplomatic practice initiated under Global Korea. 
Hosting and chairing the 2010 G20 set a solid foundation for Seoul's 
leadership role. In late 2011, Korea hosted the 4th High-Level Forum 
on Aid Effectiveness at Busan and helped to bridge Western donors 
and developing countries by bringing the development agenda into the 
conventional aid effectiveness agenda. Korea hosted the 2nd Nuclear 
50 ____________________ The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 33(2)•2015
Jojin V. John _______________________________________________________________
Security Summit in March 2012, the largest summit in the security ﬁeld, 
involving more than 53 heads of state and international organizations 
(Lee 2012). From Seoul's perspective, organizing the event was not only 
an opportunity to inﬂuence the agenda but also, more importantly, to 
get Korea into the limelight. 
Increasing Korea's contribution to the global public good, like inter-
national security and peacekeeping, was interpreted as another step 
towards building Global Korea. The Lee administration emphasized 
Korea's transformation from a consumer to a producer of international 
security, in keeping with Western foreign policy rhetoric (Snyder 2012). 
The peacekeeping initiative included:  the establishment of a 3000-strong 
standing unit dedicated to overseas deployments; legislation to author-
ize the deployment up to 1000 Korean personnel for UN peacekeeping 
operations (PKO) without prior approval from the Korean National 
Assembly; and the establishment of a PKO centre dedicated to the 
training of military personnel to be dispatched for overseas assignments 
(Chung 2010: 98).  Post-conﬂict resolution is another area to which Korea 
contributed through the establishment of a Provincial Reconstruction 
Team (PRT) of 336 personnel in Afghanistan.27 
Under the Global Korea strategy, Korea's role in international devel-
opment strengthened. Korea's developmental activism is largely built 
on the experience of having been a former aid recipient that became a 
donor. Just a few months after assuming ofﬁce, the Lee administration 
sought membership of OECD-DAC. Responding to Korea's OECD-DAC 
entry in 2010, the Korean Foreign Ministry observed that 'by joining the 
DAC, Korea has been ofﬁcially recognized as a country that has trans-
formed itself from an emerging donor to an advanced donor. It will 
help enhance Korea's status by reafﬁrming its determination to make 
contributions to the international community'.28 Under the Global Korea 
vision, Korea has substantially expanded its development assistance, 
increasing its ODA by 65 per cent, from approximately USD 700 million 
in 2008 to USD 1.2 billion in 2011. Korea's ODA of approximately USD 
1.2 billion is 0.12 per cent of the country's gross national income, less 
than the DAC average of 0.32 per cent. Seoul has pledged to increase 
this ﬁgure to 0.25 per cent by 2015 (John 2014).
Another Global Korea agenda was to promote the model of 'Green 
Growth', and to thus play a larger role on the issue of global warming 
and climate change. The concept received global attention when Korea 
adopted 'low carbon green growth' as its new development vision, which 
was swiftly followed by the release in 2009 of its National Strategy for 
_________________________________________________________________________51
_____________________________ Globalization, National Identity and Foreign Policy
Green Growth and the Five-Year Plan for Green Growth. This vision was 
reﬂected in several international initiatives designed to reframe the status 
of Korea's environmental policy, presenting the Green Growth model as 
an innovative and uniquely Korean answer to sustainable development 
(Ikenberry and Mo 2013; Shim 2010). The Global Green Growth Institute 
(GGI) was established in Seoul in 2010, and was later elevated to interna-
tional organization status at the Rio+20 Conference in 2012; it was the ﬁrst 
Korean-led international organization. Through the institutionalization of 
the Green Growth agenda at global level, Korea sought to enhance its vis-
ibility and leadership capacity (O'Donnell 2012).29 The Lee administration 
also sought to establish its visibility and moral authority by announcing 
an ambitious target for the reduction of carbon emissions to the standard 
levels of the annexe 1 countries of the Kyoto Protocol, even though Korea 
was classiﬁed as 'developing' in climate terms. Announcing this action, 
President Lee said 'South Korea can boost its national status and pride 
by voluntarily announcing an emissions target'.30
Conclusion 
This article set out to historicize the evolution of Global Korea, to provide 
an alternative reading of contemporary Korean foreign policy from the 
vantage point of national identity politics in the context of globalization. 
It focused on the continuity and authority of seonjinguk discourse and 
its inﬂuence on Korean foreign policy. The article demonstrated that in 
order to be perceived as an 'advanced nation', Korea aimed to achieve 
seonjinguk status not only in the economic ﬁeld but in all domains of 
Korean life, including diplomatic practices. Thus, the globalization of 
Korean foreign policy means meeting the demand to 'catch up' with the 
diplomatic standards of seonjinguk. 
However, Korea's international role was vaguely deﬁned, reﬂect-
ing abstract and ambiguous representations of seonjinguk diplomatic 
standards in Korean foreign policy discourse, interpreted as expanding 
Seoul's diplomatic reach across the globe and participating in interna-
tional organizations. OECD membership in 1996 was regarded as a 
signiﬁcant event in the transformation of Korea's status in international 
affairs, as a nation at the threshold of achieving advanced nation status. 
Although the progressive governments under Kim Dae-jung and Roh 
Moo-hyun used the discursive authority of seonjinguk in pushing for-
ward appropriate economic and political reforms, it was utilized less 
in their foreign policy. 
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The return of a conservative regime in 2008 under President Lee 
Myung-bak marked the reassertion of the discourse of seonjinguk in 
Korean identity and nation branding, particularly in international af-
fairs. Global Korea was the discursive site where the assertion of middle 
power identity and the project of achieving seonjinguk status converged. 
Middle power identity provided a clear template for the shaping of 
Korea's diplomatic practice and international role, under the unifying 
slogan of Global Korea. 
Jojin V. John is a Post-Doctoral Fellow at the Centre for East Asian Studies, 
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'catch up' with seonjinguk. The self-other relations between seonjinguk and hujinguk 
presented in this article are more temporal in nature and internal in character. Thus, 
'hujinguk' was the alienated other of the desired 'seonjinguk'  identity of Korea in the 
initial stage of modernization in the early 1960s.
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to be designated as seonjinguk. President Lee also held this idea of seonjiguk. For 
instance on addressing the nation President Lee said, “If Korea can get past the 
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Korea to soar into an advanced country. We cannot afford to miss this opportunity”. 
See 'Address by President Lee Myung-bak on the 63rd Anniversary of National 
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13  Address to the nation by President Lee Myung-bak before leaving on a trip to the 
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2014.
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policy under the Global Korea banner are as follows. First, Lee adopted a hard-line 
approach to North Korea, a complete turnaround from the engagement policy of his 
predecessors, Kim Dae-jung (1998–2003) and Roh Moo-hyun (2003–2008). Second, 
he promoted a strong US–Korean strategic alliance, which was at its lowest point 
during the previous administration. Third, the 'New Asia Initiative' promoted greater 
engagement with Asian countries. See Sohn and Kang 2013.
19  Since the initiation of Global Korea foreign policy, Seoul has evolved to become the 
hub for academic and policy debates on middle powers. In shaping Korea's mid-
dle power diplomacy many efforts have been made to learn from the experience of 
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from Canada and Australia, academic publications, think-tank interactions, etc. 
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in the 2014 Anholt-GfK Roper Nation Brands Index (NBI) overall brand ranking. 
http://eng.ajunews.com/view/20141114091441183. Accessed 3 December 2014.
21  Lee Myung-bak, Presidential speech during South Korea's Independence Day,15 
August 2008. http://bit.ly/1P0FrxD. Accessed 3 December 2014.
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http://bit.ly/1R9JmHy. Accessed 3 December 2014.
23  In 2009 the Korean government initiated World Friends Korea, a program that will 
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worldfriendskorea.or.kr.
24  Named after the Korean culture boom that has swept across Asia, this programme 
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Korea did by providing them with technological support.
25  This is an initiative to foster a greater sense of multiculturalism and open-minded-
ness in Korean society by promoting exchange programmes, sending volunteers 
abroad, and establishing cultural centres to educate domestic Koreans about other 
cultures.
26  In promoting Korean image internationally through the promotion of Korean lan-
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guage, in 2010 the government uniﬁed all the Korean language institutes around the 
world under one title, the King Sejong Institute (named after the famous king who 
invented hangeul, the Korean alphabet). This is akin to France's Alliance Française 
or Germany's Goethe-Institute.
27  John Hemmings, The ROK Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan, Washington: 
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2014.
30  South Korea pledges emissions cut, Financial Times, 17 November 2009 http://on.ft.
com/1KNkBfT. Accessed 10 March 2014.
REFERENCES
Cheong Wa Dae 2009. Global Korea: The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Korea. 
Seoul: Cheong Wa Dae.
Chung, Chung-joo and Han Woo Park 2010. 'Textual Analysis of a Political Message: 
the Inaugural Addresses of Two Korean Presidents'. Theory and Methods 49 (2): 
215–239.
Chung, Eun-sook 2010. 'Korea's Law on UNPKO and Participation in International 
Peacekeeping Missions'. Korea Focus 18 (2): 98-102.
De Cellia, Rudolf et al 1999. 'The Discursive Construction of National Identities'. Dis-
course & Society 10 (2): 149-173.
Escobar, Arturo 1995. Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third 
World. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Gill, Barry and Dong-sook Gill 2000. 'South Korea and Globalisation: The Rise of 
Globalism”. In Samuel Kim (ed.) East Asia and Globalisation. Oxford: Rowman and 
Littleﬁeld Publishers: 81-102.
Han, Seung-soo 2008. 'Charting a New Frontier: 'Global Korea' in the Twenty-First 
Century'. The Adelphi Papers 48 (400-401): 103-110. 
Hansen, Lene 2006. Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War. London: 
Routledge.  
Hansen, Lene 2012. 'Discourse Analysis, Post-structuralism, and Foreign Policy'. In S. 
Smith, A. Hadﬁeld and T. Dunne (eds.). Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press: 94-109.
Ikenberry, G. John and Jongryn Mo 2013. The Rise of Korean Leadership: Emerging Powers 
and Liberal International Order. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Im, Eui-yong 2014. 'Critical Study on the Advancement Discourse of Lee Myung-bak 
Government' [Imyeongbak Jeongbuui Seonjinhwadamrone Daehan Bipanjeok Go-
chal]. Journal of Government Studies 20 (2): 355-396.
John, Jojin V. 2014. 'Becoming and Being a Middle Power: Exploring a New Dimension 
of South Korea's Foreign Policy'. China Report 50 (4): 325-341.
Jordaan, Eduard 2003. 'The Concept of a Middle Power in International Relations: 
Distinguishing between Emerging and Traditional Middle Powers'. Politikon: South 
African Journal of Political Studies 30(1): 165-181.
Kalinowski, Thomas and Hyekyung Cho 2012. 'Korea's Search for a Global Role between 
Hard Economic Interests and Soft Power'. European Journal of Development Research 
56 ____________________ The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 33(2)•2015
Jojin V. John _______________________________________________________________
24 (2): 242–260.
Kang, Eliot 2000. 'Segyehwa Reform of the South Korean Developmental State'. In 
Korea's Globalisation. In S. Kim (ed.) Korea's Globalisation. New York: Cambridge 
University Press 2000: 76-101.
Kim, Eun Mee and Jae Eun Lee 2013. 'Busan and Beyond: South Korea and the Transi-
tion from Aid Effectiveness to Development Effectiveness'. Journal of International 
Development 25 (6): 787–801. 
Kim, Eun Mee, Kim Pil Ho and Kim Jinkyung. 2013. 'From Development to Develop-
ment Cooperation: Foreign Aid, Country Ownership, and the Developmental State 
in South Korea'. Paciﬁc Review 26 (3): 313–336.
Kim, Jongtae 2011a. The discourse of sonjin'guk: South Korea's Eurocentric Modern Identities 
and Worldviews. Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
Kim, Jongtae 2011b. 'South Korea's Historical Constructions of Advanced Country: 
The Discourse of Seonjinguk from the 1980s to the Present'. Society and Theory 18: 
315-351.
Kim, Jongtae 2012. 'The West and East Asian National Identities: A Comparison of 
Discourses of Korean Seonjinguk, Japanese Nihonjinron, and Chinese New National-
ism'. In Jan Nederveen Pieterse and Kim Jongtae (eds.) Globalization and Development 
in East Asia. New York: Routledge: 80-97.
Kim, Jongtae 2014. 'The Discursive Structure of Developmentalism in Korea: A Compari-
son of Geundaehwa, Segyehwa, and Seonjinhwa Discourses' [hanguk baljeonjuuiui 
damron gujo: geundaehwa, segyehwa, seonjinhwa damronui bigyo]. Economy and 
Society [gyeongjewa sahoe] 103:166-195.
Kim, Samuel 2000. Korea's Globalization. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Kim, Samuel 2000a. 'Korea and Globalization: A framework for Analysis'. In Samuel 
Kim (ed.) Korea's Globalization. New York: Cambridge University Press: 1-28.
Kim, Samuel 2000b. 'Korea's Segyehwa Drive: Promise versus Performance'. In Samuel 
Kim (ed.) Korea's Globalization. New York: Cambridge University Press: 242-281.
Koh, B.C 2000. 'Segyehwa, the Republic of Korea, and the United Nations'. In Samuel 
Kim (ed.) Korea's Globalization. New York: Cambridge University Press:196-216.
Korean Overseas Information Service (KOIS) 1995. The Segyehwa Policy of Korea under 
President Kim Young-Sam. Seoul: Korean Overseas Information Service.
Lee, Chae-jin 2000. 'South Korea's Foreign Relations'. In Samuel Kim (ed.) Korea's 
Globalization. New York: Cambridge University Press:170-195.
Lee, Sook-jong 2011. 'Global Identity and South Korea's Diplomacy'. In Won-taek Kang 
and Nae-young Lee (eds.) Understanding Korean Identity: Through the Lens of Opinion 
Survey. Seoul: East Asia Institute.
Lee, Sook-jong 2012. 'South Korea as New Middle Power Seeking Complex Diplomacy'. 
EAI Asia Security Initiative, Working Paper 25. Seoul: East Asia Institute. 
Lee, Tae-joo. 2003. 'An Anthropological Study of the Korean Foreign Aid Policy: Mak-
ing Advanced Country and Development Discourse' [Hankuk ui Daeoe Wonjo 
Jeongchaeke daehan Inryuhakjeok Yeongu: 'Seonjinkuk Mandeulgi' wa Baljeon 
Damron]. Cross Cultural Studies [Bigyo Munhwa Yeongu] 9 (1): 139-174.
Levin, Norman D. and Yong-Sup Han 2002. Sunshine in Korea: The South Korean Debate 
over Policies Toward North Korea. Santa Monica, CA: RAND.
MOFAT (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade) 1997. Diplomatic White Paper. Seoul: 
MOFAT.
MOFAT (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2008. Diplomatic White Paper. Seoul: 
MOFAT.
Moon, Chung-in and Taehwan Kim 2004. 'South Korea's International Relations: Chal-
lenges of Developmental Realism?' In Samuel S. Kim (ed.) International Relations of 
_________________________________________________________________________57
_____________________________ Globalization, National Identity and Foreign Policy
Northeast Asia. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littleﬁeld Publishers: 251-280. 
Nederveen Pieterse, Jan 2009. Development Theory. London: Sage.
Park, Se-il 2006. The Seonjinhwa Strategy of South Korea [Daehanminguk Seonjinhwa 
Jeonlyak]. Paju: 21segi Books.
PSPC (Presidential Segyehwa Promotion Committee) (Segyehwach'ujinuiwŏnhoe) 
1998. The Segyehwa Whitepaper [Segyehwa Baekseo]. Seoul: PSPC.
Saxer, Carl J 2013. 'Capabilities and Aspirations: South Korea's Rise as a Middle Power'. 
Asia Europe Journal 11 (4): 397-413.
Shin, Gi-wook 2003. The Paradox of Korean Globalization. Stanford: Asia/Paciﬁc Research 
Center, Stanford University. 
Shin, Soon-ok 2015. 'South Korea's Elusive Middlepowermanship: Regional or Global 
Player?'. The Paciﬁc Review. DOI: 10.1080/09512748.2015.101344. Accessed 30 Au-
gust 2015.
Snyder, Scott A 2012. Global Korea South Korea's Contributions to International Security. 
New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press.
Sohn, Yul and Won-Taek Kang 2013. 'South Korea in 2012: An Election Year under 
Rebalancing Challenges'. Asian Survey. 53(1): 198-205
Son, Hyeonju 2014.  'Analysis of Reasons and Countermeasures for the Necessity of 
Alternative Futures Discourses in South Korea'. Futures 55:1–14.
Stairs, Denis 1998. 'Of Medium Powers and Middling Roles'. In Ken Booth (ed.) Statecraft 
and Security: The Cold War and Beyond. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Watson, Iain 2011. 'Global Korea: Foreign Aid and National Interests in An Age of 
Globalization'. Contemporary Politics 17 (1): 53-69.
